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FINAL REPORT OF TICOM TEAM I

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This is the final report of TICOM Team I and associated individuals on the exploitation of KAUFBEUREN and the BERCHTESGADEN area.

TICOM

16 June 1945.

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NOTE to accompany

REPORT OF TICO TEAM 1

Photographs of the 1) German directive giving the table of organization of RLL-Vorschungsausschuss and 2) chart based on the above are available in Room 33, Block D, (PBX Ext. 163), and may be obtained on application to Lt. Pendergrass.

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COMPLETE LIST OF TROs

Those marked * are the original Team 1, the others were attached for varying periods.

- *OESER, O. W/Cdr. R.A.F.V.R. (Chief TRO)
- *CAMPAIGNE, H. Lt.Cdr. U.S.N.R. (Deputy Chief)

- BARRINGER, H. Capt. U.S.A.
- CARTER, T. Capt. I.C.
- COCKERELL, H. Lt. R.N.V.R.
- COOLIDGE, J. Lt.(j.g.) U.S.N.R.
- CROWE, R. Major U.S.A.
- DONAHUE, C. Major U.S.A.
- ELDRIDGE, J. Major U.S.A.
- FORMANIAK, C. Capt. U.S.A.
- LAWRANCE, L. Capt. I.C.
- LEVENSJON, A. 1st Lt. U.S.A.
- LIVELY, J. 1st Lt. U.S.A.
- MAXWELL, I. P/O. R.A.F.V.R.
- *McINTOSH, A. Major I.C.
- *NORLAND, S.S. 1st Lt. U.S.A.
- PICKERING, F. Lt.Col. I.C.
- ROOD, L. Lt.Col. U.S.A.
- *RUSHWORTH, E. Major I.C.
- *SAYRES, G. F/Lt. R.A.F.V.R.
- *STONE, L. Capt. U.S.A.
- *TESTER, R. Major I.C.
- *WHITAKER, P. 1st Lt. U.S.A.

CHECK LIST OF TARGETS

<u>Place</u>	<u>Name of Target</u>	<u>Diary Reference</u>
Alm		May 26
Augsburg	Luftgau VII, branch	May 8
Bad Aibling	NAK 626	May 24, 26
Bad Gastein	Japanese Diplomats	May 17, 25
Bad Reichenhall	DV Alpen	May 18, 24
BERCHTESGADEN	Berghof	May 13
	Goering's Adjutancy	May 20
	Goering's Stabsant	May 22
	Goering's Train	May 20
	LV 1000	May 15, 16
	Reichskanzlei	May 13
	(See also Strub)	
Bruck		June 1
Bsuch	Signals Dump	May 24
Dorfheim		June 1
Fridolfing		May 16, 17
Fuschlsee	Ribbentrop's Villa	May 28
Glaserbach	SS HQ	May 17
Hallein	Signals Dump	May 28
Igls		May 15
Innsbruck	LV Regt. 350	May 18, 21
Kaufbeuren	RLM/Forschungsamt	May 9, ff.
Klessheim	Gaestehaus des Fuehrers	May 16, 17
Lend		June 1
Luggau		May 17, 25
Maierhof		June 1
Oberlautertach		Appendix 1
Pfunds		May 15
Pilsen		May 22
Pretzfeld		Appendix 1
Reit im Winkel		May 30
Rosenheim	Baudot Installation	May 20-23, 25, June 5
Schliersee	OKW/Chi	May 21
Strub	OKL HQ	May 12
	OKW HQ Jaegerkaserne	May 18-21
Surheim	DV Alpen	May 19
Toesens	AOK 19, Signals Dump	May 9, 11, 15
Unterstein	Dr. Vierling	Appendix 1
Wasserburg	Signals Dump	May 25
Zell-am-See	Brandenburg Train	May 14-16

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INTRODUCTION

The report is given in the form of a Diary with 17 Appendices.

Appendix 1 contains a summary of the work done by three officers who were later attached to Team 1.

Appendix 2 is straightforward, as the war had been officially at an end for only one day, and had in any case swept a long way past Kaufbeuren. There were consequently few difficulties of policy or procedure.

Appendix 3 attempts to give a picture of the peculiar conditions in which the greater part of the Team's work had to be done. It should therefore be read immediately after a cursory inspection of the Diary.

Also to be borne in mind is the fact - not otherwise elaborated - that the end of the war brought about considerable changes in TICOM policy. Of these, the ones most seriously affecting the work of the Team were orders from above that no more civilians were to be sent to the U.K. and that only a very limited number of military prisoners could be exported owing to lack of accommodation in the cages and the impending move of C.S.D.I.C. to the Continent.

TICOM was not the only body to be shaken by the end of the war in Europe. Even the august S.H.A.E.F. was not kept altogether free of confusion and uncertainties, and it was not unknown for mutually contradictory orders to be issued by different departments. However, staunch friends of TICOM at SHAEF, and surprising streaks of bluff and banditry which broke the surface in members of the Team, served to overcome all obstacles - even those of acquiring food and drink.

The last Appendices, Nos. 16 and 17, list briefly the trophies of this private war, which, in spite of an air of gloom hovering over some of the pages, was enjoyed by all.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Team 1 had an exceptionally large number of willing helpers, whose ranks varied from Air Vice Marshals and Generals to those of anonymous G.I.s who sprayed white stars on our captured trucks, or smuggled extra rations aboard. But to the following we are more especially indebted for practical help and counsel; and the list is far from being exhaustive:

Lieut. Col. Bearce, G-2 (S.I.), 6 A.G.
Captain Betts, 3260 R.I. Coy.
Colonel Bicher, Director, S.I.D. ETOUSA
Captain Drewitt, S.L.U.
Major Dunn, S-2 (S.I.), 7th Army
Major Handelsmann, Acting Signals Officer, 101 Airborne Div.
Captain Jones, 3253 R.I. Coy.
Colonel Mattison, D/A.C. of S., A-2, SHAEF
Colonel Perry, G-2 Exec., 7th U.S. Army
Colonel Quinn, G-2, 7th U.S. Army
Colonel Scott, G-2 (Sigint) SHAEF
Group Captain Scott-Farnie, D/A.C. of S., A-2 (Sigint) SHAEF

Praise is also due to the drivers and radio operators. The former achieved miracles with often faulty transportation over bad roads. The latter never failed to make contact.

TICOM - TEAM 1 Diary

May 4:

At 0630 Team 1 consisting of:-

W/Cdr. A. Oeser, R.A.F.V.R. Officer in Charge
Lt. Cdr. H. H. Campaigne, U.S.N.R.
Major A. McIntosh, I.C.
Major R. P. Tester, I.C.
Major E. Rushworth, I.C.
Capt. L. T. Stone, U.S.A.
F/Lt. G. Sayer, R.A.F.V.R.
Lt. S. S. Norland, U.S.A.
Lt. P. Whitaker, U.S.A.

left for Paris. They had considerable difficulty over billets and transport there.

May 5:

The party was in Paris arranging transport and considering routes and the general outline of activities.

May 6:

The party left Paris at 0630 in one jeep and one 2.5 ton truck provided by Col. Bicher's organisation. They arrived at 6 A.G. H.Q. at Heidelberg at 2130.

May 7:

The main party went to Augsburg, while Oeser remained behind for conferences with Lt. Col. Bearce (S.I.), Major Warner Gardner, Major Marc Spiegel and Lt. Col. Torielli (G-2). Later in the day Oeser flew to Augsburg, and by chance met Lt. Coolidge, U.S.N.R., Major Eldridge and Captain Formaniak, U.S.A., outside 7 Army C.P. They had arrived from Paris via Fernsheim and Regensburg. For a report of their earlier activities see Appendix I. They and their jeep and trailer were attached to Team I. Oeser then started conferences with Col. Quinn (G2) Col. Perry (G2 Exec.), Major Nielsen, Lt. Col. Corning (A.C. of S.G2 XII TAC), Major Dunn (Signals Intelligence) and Major Radam(T-force)

May 8:

Seventh Army agreed to screen selected prisoners and to give the team special security passes. Arrangements were made to have all prisoners wanted by TICOM, including civilians, held at a special 7th Army "freezing" camp. T-force passes were provided by Col Frankel, (T section). The basements previously inhabited by the branch station of Luftgau VII (III/LGN Rgt. 7 and L.N. Eu. A. Rgt. 3) which had been put under guard by Major Nielsen, (XII TAC) were investigated. They yielded nothing of TICOM interest, except the important confirmation, in P/L on a piece of teleprinter tape, that RLM/Forschungsamt had been located at Kaufbeuren. Safes and a strongroom were blown, but were empty.

Most of the party left for Kaufbeuren that evening, arriving at 1845. Oeser followed later, after various conferences had ended.

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May 9:

Tester, Eldridge and Formaniak went to the Tirol to inspect signal material reported by 3260 R.I. Company as being at Toesens.

The rest of the party went to the barracks near the Kaufbeuren airfield and there inspected the signals target, which was being guarded by personnel of 3260 R.I. Company, (based at Igls, near Innsbruck). Some documents and equipment were found, indicating this was occupied by R.L.M./Forschungsamt, but giving no firm indication that cryptographic matters were studied there.

May 10:

Exploitation of documents and interrogation of personnel got under way in Kaufbeuren.

Lt. Col. L. L. Rood, U.S.A.A.C. who was on a mission from 6 A.G., was persuaded to join the party with his jeep.

Some equipment was sent to U.K. with copies of a document giving the organisation of RLM/FA. Only a few minor officials and typists had remained behind in Kaufbeuren. Some of these were traced and questioned.

May 11

The day began with a final inspection of Kaufbeuren. A report on RLM/Forschungsamt based on the investigation of the Target and interrogation of personnel who had worked in it appears in Appendix 2. Tester and Rushworth, who had returned after being refused permission to enter the signals dump at Toesens, left for Augsburg. At Major Dunn's suggestion they were to interrogate Oberinspector Melcher, i/c signals equipment 19th A.O.K. He was not there, so they proceeded to Munich where billets were obtained from T-force. The main party went direct to Munich and got billets from T-section. Oeser and Rood left for Berchtesgaden via XXI Corps. Eldridge, Formaniak and Coolidge started for Berchtesgaden, spending the night in Salzburg.

May 12:

Tester and Rushworth returned to Augsburg, talked to Melcher who informed them that to the best of his knowledge there was some non-morse equipment at Toesens - and went on to Berchtesgaden via Munich. Campaigne went from Munich to Rosenheim with the majority of the party to draw rations. He continued to Berchtesgaden and made contact with Tester and Rushworth very impressively in the main street, but failed to contact Oeser, Rood, Coolidge and Eldridge, who had established themselves in the Hotel Deutsches Haus.

Oeser, Rood, Eldridge and Coolidge visited OKL in the EDM school at Strub. See Appendix 3.

May 13:

Tester and Rushworth left to examine Toesens.

Campaigne and Sayers left for the Salzburg area with the truck, which broke down and foiled the project.

Eldridge and Coolidge visited various offices on the Berghof. See Appendix 4.

May 13: (continued)

Coolidge visited Reichskanzlei near Berchtesgaden. See Appendix 5.

Oeser and Rood again visited the BDM Schule at Strub. They interrogated General Koller (C.S., OKL) who telephoned General Martini (C.S.O., OKL) who ordered Oberst Morgenstern (C of S to General Martini) to give them information on the Sturgeon machines found in the basement.

May 14:

The rest of the team, having been hailed from the hotel balcony, moved into the Hotel Deutsches Haus. McIntosh got a telephone installed for TICOM from 101 Division.

Rood and Oeser visited the Zell area and found the Brandenburg trains, Jellyfish and OB. West.

Major Donahue, Capt. Carter, Capt Barringer, an advance party of Team 2, arrived in the morning, followed in the afternoon by the remainder of that team - Lt. Cockerell, Capt Lawrence, Lt. Lively, Lt. Levenson, P/O Maxwell.

May 15:

Oeser drove to Augsburg to send a long statement on the situation and findings to TICOM via SLU and to consult 7th Army G2 and Major Dunn on steps to be taken.

Rood, using his authority as representative of 6th Army Group, persuaded 101 Division to allow him to take 3 Jellyfish trucks from Dorfheim as far as Berchtesgaden.

McIntosh contacted Major Handelsmann (Signals) of 101 Airborne. Two Sergeants, Le Bare and Murphy and a jeep were put at his disposal. With these men he visited installations at Haus Hienlein and the Hotel Vierjahreszeiten.

Tester and Rushworth returned to Berchtesgaden after a visit to Pfunds, Toesens and Igls. From AOK 19's signals dump at Toesens they had sent some SZ 42's and decimetre sets back to U.K. via Paris.

May 16

Oeser and Rood visited 356 Parachute Regiment to get a safe conduct pass, and evacuated to Berchtesgaden the three remaining transmitter and receiver trucks, together with all necessary operating personnel.

Tester and Levenson left for U.K. with convoy of 6 trucks and 12 prisoners and reported to 7th Army at Augsburg. See Appendix 7.

Carter, Coolidge and McIntosh visited the installation at Haus Hienlein in Berchtesgaden and identified it as LV 1000. See Appendix 6. Six T 52 E machines were impounded and crated. It was also established **that the organization at the Hotel Vierjahreszeiten was the Schnellfunkstelle of LV 1000. A label on one of the machines here showed that the Schnellfunkstelle was working through the stations at Schloss Kienheim and Fridolfing. These were therefore subsequently investigated. See**

May 16: (continued)

Appendices 9 and 10.

A large dump of standard signals equipment was also discovered in the same building and reported to Major Handelsmann.

May 17:

Pickering arrived with Major Crowe (AAF)
G/C Humphreys also came to Berchtesgaden.

Stone, Cockerell, McIntosh went to Bad Gastein where 127 Japanese were located in the Hotel Astoria, including diplomatic personnel, headed by Baron Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin. The local American Army authorities, the military government and resident political intelligence team were without instructions, but the Army agreed to strengthen the guard on the Hotel. Oshima and Nagai were interviewed. They claimed diplomatic immunity for all but 6 persons and stated that there were no archives with them. Credentials had not so far been checked.

Lawrance having obtained from Oberst Hepp, IA of Chef HNW, the location of various German Army Sigint Officers, Donahue, Rushworth and Lawrance contracted Oberst Boetzel, General der N.A. at Luggau near Dorfgastein. A history of his organisation was obtained and important personnel were identified.

Campaigne, Carter, Norland and Maxwell went to Glasenbach, former S.S. H.Q. and examined premises of Nachrichtendienst, recovering a few documents. Two safes were blown open, but no documents were found in them. See Appendix 8.

Campaigne and Carter went to Schloss Klessheim, former Gasthaus des Fuehrers. Descriptive booklets of transmitters were removed. See Appendix 9.

May 18

Donahue, with Lawrance, Barringer, Lively, Sayers and Maxwell left for the Innsbruck area to begin the hunt for LN Regt. 350. (OKL/CHI)

Oeser again visited Augsburg at the request of Colonel Quinn to discuss the disposal of SLU and to draft the command channel directives on the military Y service personnel located up to date, and the Kaufbeuren civilians. Meanwhile an order had been issued by SHAEF "freezing" all personnel, documents and equipment in the southern area. SHAEF air staff sent Group Captain Scott-Farnie and party to visit the area and report to Air Staff.

Pickering and Rushworth revisited Boetzel and interviewed some of his officers.

McIntosh, Coolidge and Carter visited D.V. Alpen in the Jaeger Kaserne at Bad Reichenhall.

May 19:

Carter, Stone, Coolidge, Whitaker and Lively visited Fridolfing and Surheim (see Appendix 10)

Satisfactory conferences were held with G/C Scott-Farnie and Brig. Gen. Harper.

McIntosh, acting on information from Major Handelsmann made a preliminary reconnaissance of the cellars of the Jaeger Kaserne at Strub, and got Sgt. Garber of the 101 Airborne to search the buildings thoroughly. He brought back samples of documents from the cellars which proved to have served as a repository for OKW Hq. Some of the documents were of considerable importance for TICOM.

Documents buried by RLM general staff were exhumed in the presence of Campaigne and McIntosh and were found to be not ours. See Appendix 11.

May 20:

Oeser, en route for U.K. accompanied Scott-Farnie and party by air to Shaef at Rheims. Their signals were drafted

- a) giving orders to 7th Army to allow the Jellyfish convoy under Tester to proceed on its way to the U.K.
- b) to allow G/C Humphreys to evacuate by air Y-Service personnel wanted by Air Ministry and TICOM.

Col. Scott was also seen at Rheims and given a survey of Team I's activities. He took Oeser to the C.S.O., who wanted information on telephone and T.P. exchanges in Berchtesgaden. G/C Scott-Farnie also took Oeser to report to the P.A. of the Deputy Supreme Commander on conditions in the area. This report had important repercussions in the North, but for the time being did not affect the South.

Documents from Goering's train were examined at Military Government. They were mostly air maps and orders of battle. Not ours.

SLU arrived.

McIntosh attended safe-blowing at house of Goering's Adjutant. The safe blowing was accomplished by acetylene blow-torch. The action of this on the asbestos material in the door produced clouds of fine white powder which covered the heads of the onlookers. The first thing which one of these onlookers drew from an aperture in the opened safe was a packet of shampoo powder. Nothing of professional interest.

McIntosh returned to the Jaeger Kaserne at Strub with Norland, Carter, Campaigne, Whitaker and Coolidge and had all documents removed, with the exception of what might be in eight as yet unopened safes. Most of these documents came from a large store room marked Bettstelle and consisted mainly of Abwehr reports for the year 1944, but later another (locked) room was discovered which contained mainly the private baggage of part of the Staff including a Major Nielsen. Among Nielsen's personal effects a considerable number of highly secret documents were found, including the first so far discovered to give any account of OKW-Chi. The cellar contained also one Tunny machine (undamaged) and a number of badly damaged T 52 d/e's, a large amount of switchboard equipment, about two tons of maps, and several boxes of already fused stick grenades. The discovery of the maps was reported and they were later removed by 7th Army Gp. None of the equipment was removed by TICOM, except a pair of jack-boots which Lt. Cdr. Campaigne wore for several days.

In the evening Major Dunn rang up communicating a report from Lt. Sims of 215 CIC Rosenheim that there were some PW's at Bad Aibling who had been in an outfit at Rosenheim and who had buried some equipment there.

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May 21:

Ocser arrived B.P.

Pickering, Cockerell, Whitaker visited the Schliersee and Tegernsee areas seeking traces of the Southern half OKW/Chi known to have been in the area in April. Enquiries of local U.S. forces, C.I.C.'s, Military Government and Free Bavarian Movement proved fruitless.

McIntosh and Stone had 8 safes at Jäger Kaserne, Strub, blown, and found them all empty.

Campaigne, Rushworth and Carter, acting on Major Dunn's telephone call, visited Rosenheim and located P/W's at Bad Aibling who claimed to know of buried material. Interrogation was carried out.

McIntosh obtained a permit to examine the tunnels at Obersalzburg and spent a considerable time underground, especially below the S.S. barracks. He found nothing of TICOM interest.

Donahue and party returned from Innsbruck.

May 22:

The Bad Aibling prisoners at Rosenheim dug up buried material which proved to be a complete station for interception and decryption of Russian BAUDOT traffic. Under Carter's supervision (with the help of Coolidge, Campaigne and Rushworth) reconstitution of the station was begun and partially carried out by nightfall.

Pickering and Crowe left for Munich, visiting Rosenheim en route.

Whitaker, Norland and Cockerell went to Göring's Kommandantur, Berchtesgaden. No documents were found there.

Donahue, with McIntosh, Lawrence, Barringer, Lively, Sayers and Maxwell left for Pilsen.

May 23.

Campaigne, Rushworth, Carter, Whittaker and Norland combined in strenuous efforts to prepare the Russian BAUDOT intercept station for the road. The station was ready by scheduled time but a transport hold-up made a late night start inadvisable. See Appendix 14.

The expected aircraft for Rood, Humphrys and the prisoners did not arrive.

May 24.

Rushworth and Norland left Rosenheim for Augsburg with 4 Diesel trucks, 8 tons equipment, 23 prisoners, including 4 mechanics and 4 drivers. The convoy made slow progress. (60 miles in five hours)

Coolidge visited Salzburg to get some documents from XV Corps G-2, to wit a letter from one Haupts, a P/W at Bad Aibling, forwarded to Team I by Lt. Col. Pickering. See Appendix 15.

May 25.

Campaigne & Whitaker went to the BSUCH dump (documents collected), LUGGAU (interview with Boetzel), BAD GASTEIN (ascertained presence of Shaef Mission with Japanese).

Carter & Cockerell went to ROSENHEIM (CIC requested to locate Thiel of OKW/CHI), WASSERBURG (signals dump in lunatic asylum inspected - results negative).

Group Captain Humphreys at last left by air with documents for Ticom, P/W Obatltm Kirnitz (Ic, OKL) and FRIEDRICH (Gen. Nafue/III Abt., OKL). Kirnitz's Ford was liberated for the greater mobility of TICOM.

Rood left Team 1 for U.S.A. via Shaef.

May 26.

Carter and Coolidge visited Bad Aibling to see Sigint P/W's Hauptl, Klett, Lauerbach, on basis of Hauptl's letter. (See Appendix 15).

Whitaker and Stone visited Kopp at Alm and Boetzel at Luggau to get them to prepare written outlines of their organisations.

Documents from the safe of Dr. H. Ficker received from Divisional G2. Political reports only. After examination, passed to Lt. Wolf, T-Force for disposal.

May 27. REST DAY!

May 28.

Campaigne, Carter, Cockerell and Coolidge went to

HALLEIN (inspection of signals dump)
ST. WOLFGANG (inspection of naval school - negative)
FUSCHLSEE (von Ribbentrop's summer home - evacuated Auswaertiges Amt - negative)
SALZBURG (S.S. prisoner Grobe, said to know about invisible inks, located). (See Appendix 12)

Lt. Pettengill arrived at Berchtesgaden (from Dunn), as well as Capt. Schell and Lt. Gaynor (SID - ETOUSA).

Outline by Kopp was received.

May 29.

Carter, Coolidge, Whitaker went to Salzburg to interrogate Grobe. (See Appendix 13).

Campaigne went to Munich to renew the party's passes.

Oeser, on his return journey, made arrangements with Shaef in Frankfurt for air transport of teams, documents and the BAUDOT equipment, which was still sitting in Rushworth's lap at Augsburg. With Scott-Farnie he visited Marburg/Lahn and reported to the Director and TICOM on the presence of 400

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tons of German Foreign Office documents being collected in the castle from various exhumations.

May 30.

Coolidge, Carter, Whitaker, Cockerell went to Reit-im-Winkel area to see Admiral Litzmann, who had, however, already been removed from the area as a P/W.

Oeser arrived (with pilot and navigator) from Frankfurt. Rushworth arrived from Augsburg for consultation.

A meeting was held at which general agreement was reached that team's mission was virtually completed, in the absence of further discoveries of men or material in the area.

Oeser saw A.V.M. Stelle, Brig. General Harper and W/Cdr Cullingham, and arranged for disposal of Sigint documents found by the many other teams now digging and divining in this area.

May 31.

It rained all day. No activity. The last bottle of Kaufbeuren wine was consumed. Cullingham's documents were inspected at Strub. Rushworth left for Augsburg.

June 1.

Oeser left by air for Frankfurt.

Carter, Coolidge, Cockerell visited Bruck, Lend, Maierhof to inspect the signals dumps, also Dorfheim to confirm that there were no further documents. Results were negative.

Campaigne, Stone, Whitaker visited Murnau to search for OKL/CHI. No traces were found after exhaustive enquiries. No trace of OKW/CHI either.

In Frankfurt, Oeser had final conferences with Scott-Farnie and Mattison; they agreed the best plan was to have permanent representatives at Shaef, arranged air transport for Team 1, got an order from A/Cdre Grierson that 4 boxes of Sigint documents removed from Berchtesgaden to St. Germain by USSTAF should be at once re-routed to BP via UK base, and flew to Orly. He also saw Major Keller (M.I.8) and gave him a verbal TELCOM sitrep.

June 2.

Whitaker, Stone and all enlisted men left with truck and jeep for Paris.

Carter and Coolidge left in remaining jeep for Munich area to make final check-up on enlisted men of Boetzel's organisation.

June 3.

Campaigne and Cockerell looking up in Berchtesgaden.

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Boetzel's organisation in transit and was not to be found, despite the efforts of Carter and Coolidge. The latter then left for Paris.

June 4.

The liberated Ford car was handed over to Lt. Wolf, T Force, Berchtesgaden.

Campaigne and Cockerell with office records and cap. docs. left Salzburg 1150 by air, arriving Wing 1800.

June 5.

Rushworth and Carter arrived by air with Baudot station (8.2 tons) at Bovingdon

McIntosh arrived from Paris.

June 6.

Conferences at EP with Col. Bicher, Col. Scott, and TICOM representatives.

June 7.

Coolidge and Stone arrived from Paris.

APPENDIX 1

DR. VIERLING: Target at OBERLAUTERBACH

Preliminary trip of Maj. Eldridge and Lt. Coolidge

About 1 May, Col. Bicher received two signals from Maj. Flint, (S.I. at Third Army) reporting a Target supposedly of TICOM interest at Oberlauterbach (south of Regensburg) and a certain Dr. Vierling, director of a laboratory engaged on research in communications equipment. This information was passed by Col. Bicher to TICOM. Col. Bicher sent Maj. Eldridge, U.S.A., and TICOM sent Lt. (jg) Coolidge, U.S.N.R., to investigate.

The party left Paris on May 4 and proceeded by jeep to Wiesbaden, reporting to S.I. 12th Army Group, thence to the headquarters of Detachment D (an American S.I. detachment) at Porsheim, north of Nuremberg, arriving there on 5 May. Maj. Flint, over the telephone, stated that Vierling was somewhere nearby, and suggested contacting the military government at Pretzfeld.

On 6 May, the party, accompanied by Capt. Formaniak of Det. D., proceeded to Pretzfeld and found that there was no military government there. However, an American S.I. Company was sharing a Schloss with a German commercial research laboratory (attached to Siemens) specializing in testing standard high tension equipment. The director of the laboratory, a Dr. Prinz, was interrogated, the names of the personnel in his organization noted, but nothing of interest to TICOM was found. Dr. Prinz informed the party that Vierling was located in a hospital on top of a nearby mountain. Although he admitted a nodding acquaintance with Vierling, he claimed never to have seen his laboratory.

In the afternoon, the party went to Unterstein near Ebermannstadt and interrogated Dr. Vierling. He was cooperative and gave all information requested. He had formerly been in charge of a laboratory at the University of Hannover. Bombed out in 1942, the laboratory was transferred to Wennehostel, north of Hannover. At the same time, Dr. Vierling organized his own private laboratory at Unterstein. The two laboratories were both directed by Dr. Vierling and worked on the same problems. The one at Unterstein conducted theoretical research and preliminary testing preparatory to the production of experimental communications equipment for the German army which took place at Wennehostel. For more than a month, Dr. Vierling had been out of touch with the Wennehostel establishment and did not know what its fate had been. He believed that some of his newest models might still be there intact.

A week before the arrival of American troops, the German army had removed all equipment in the Unterstein laboratory which they could use and taken it, Dr. Vierling believed, to a piano factory in Salzburg. Instructions were left to destroy all the rest. These were only partially carried out, the special gauges and other instruments being saved and stored in the basement of the laboratory. Dr. Vierling strenuously denied that he possessed any documents or any models of experimental equipment. The laboratory had then been taken over by the German army and was being used as a hospital under American supervision. Vierling remained unmolested in a house nearby. The key men in his organization, some fifteen in all, had remained in the immediate neighborhood and were still being paid (and fed?) by Dr. Vierling. He gave their names and stated that they were all anxious to help the Anglo-Americans.

Dr. Vierling believed that if they had access to their instruments they could reconstruct all their latest equipment in a matter of a few weeks and he assured the investigators that they were most anxious to do so for the benefit of the Allies. He also mentioned several other centres where research into communications equipment had been carried on.

APPENDIX 1 (contd.)

Dr. Vierling claimed to have developed the German Geheim Fernschreiber. He stated that he had perfected a new and far superior model, although it was not yet in production. He also mentioned work on speech scramblers and other experimental communications equipment. None of the interrogators was sufficiently expert in these matters to understand the exact nature of the experiments described. However, there was no question but that the laboratories were engaged upon most important research with communications equipment. It was apparent that although Dr. Vierling himself was a highly-trained expert, he had of recent years been obliged to devote himself to the administration of his laboratories and, although he was thoroughly familiar with the nature of the equipment being produced, he was no longer informed about all its details. For these he was obliged to rely upon subordinates.

Upon returning to Forsheim, a signal was sent to Colonel Bicher, asking for instructions, reporting the nature of Vierling's work and recommending that he and the fifteen key men in his organization be placed under arrest and be given expert interrogation. It was further recommended that his laboratory at Wennehostel be investigated, and the names of the other centres which he had mentioned were reported. Upon Lt. Coolidge's return to Paris, he left the lists of the names of the men in Prinz's and Vierling's organizations with Col. Bicher.

On 7 May, Maj. Eldridge, Capt. Formaniak and Lt. Coolidge proceeded to Regensburg to consult with Maj. Flint. The latter stated that, upon further investigation, the target at Oberlauterbach had proved to be of no SIGINT interest. It had proved to be a station devoted to the interception of British broadcasts which were then used for German propaganda purposes. All records and equipment had been turned over to the Psychological Warfare division and the target had been fully exploited. Under the circumstances, it did not seem worth visiting. Maj. Flint did not know of any other SIGINT Targets in the 3rd Army area.

Lt. Coolidge proposed that the party should return to Forsheim and await further instructions in answer to the signal of the day before. Maj. Eldridge, however, wished to go to Augsburg, headquarters of the 7th Army, and inquire if anything was known of a Target at Oberpfaffenhofen mentioned by Vierling. The party proceeded to Augsburg. There, Lt. Coolidge by chance met Wing Commander Oeser and joined Team 1 with Maj. Eldridge and Capt. Formaniak, a step approved by Col. Bicher.

Appendix 2.

RLM/FORSCHUNGSAMT, KAUFBEUREN

I. General Survey

On Wednesday, 9 May, the whole of TICOM team 1 under W/Cdr. Oeser visited the airfield at Kaufbeuren. There they inspected some buildings which had formerly belonged to the airfield staff, but which now contained evidence of occupation by some signals unit. Information of this had been given by Major Dunn, S.I. 7 Army, who had placed it under a guard consisting of Lt. Buehler, 3260 R.I.Coy. and two Sig. Corps enlisted men.

These barracks were being used to house German P/W's. Displaced persons had also made their home there, and before the occupation by U.S. troops, they had housed a Flak unit. Moreover, as later interrogations showed, the RLM/FA had been disbanded before the Americans arrived, and all documents burned. It is not surprising therefore that the site had been rather denuded of useful equipment and documents.

The buildings formerly occupied by RLM/FA consisted of six blocks directly opposite the entrance gate to the airfield. These had later been handed over to the German signals unit. They were searched on the morning of May 9th. The search produced few documents. But among them was a directive signed Schapper, Min. Dir., which disclosed that the buildings had been occupied by Reichsluftfahrtministerium/Forschungsamt, and gave a complete table of organisation of the Amt. Since practically no information about this organisation had been available to source, the nature of its operations was very imperfectly known. The organisation document, however, showed that "Forschung" might include cryptography, as Section IV dealt with "Geheimschriftwesen".

The building was thereupon gone over more carefully on the afternoon of May 9th and on May 10th. From cards removed from the doors, coupled with the known organisation, a good picture was obtained of the location of the various sub-sections. Remains of a card-index were found which appeared to be based on monitored telephone conversations. No further documents were found.

Equipment: The telephones and teleprinters were in Block 10. There were also radio receivers, Sturgeon machines of the normal type, magnetic tape recorders, and at least five Hollerith machines uncrated but obviously unused. In Block 11 there was a large amount of new photographic material and equipment.

Further information was obtained in Kaufbeuren by interrogating people formerly employed by the Forschungsamt. These confirmed:

(a) that Hauptabteilung IV at least included cryptographers, of whom ORR Paetzel was the chief, and that Abt. 8 dealt with France, Italy, the Vatican, Rumania, Belgium, Switzerland, and that it was particularly interested in Wirtschaft and Politik.

(b) that Abteilung 10 of Hptabt. V did translations.

(c) that a large number of the messages translated was commercial in content.

(d) that the organisation was responsible to Goering via Staatsekretär Dr. Koerner and that its head, Dr. Schapper, held a rank equivalent to that of Generalleutnant der Luftwaffe.

No further information could be obtained, and after the magnetic tape recorders had been despatched to Col. Bicher, the target was abandoned.

On May 21, however, information reached TICOM team 1 via C.I.C. 215 Rosenheim that Gottfried Schapper had been apprehended and sent to 7 Army. Rushworth, who was waiting in Augsburg with the BAUDOT gear, was able to sit in on the interrogation of Schapper on May 29. On May 30th Erwin Rentschler, in charge of Abteilung 13 was interrogated by 7 Army interrogators in the presence of Norland, and further interrogated in the presence of Rushworth and Norland on May 31.

These two P/W's were able to give a fair amount of information as to the working of Forschungsamt, though Schapper's information was very sketchy on details. Their statements are attached to this appendix.


Also attached is the original Schapper document reduced to a more easily intelligible genealogical table.

II. Report by Maj. Rushworth on Min. Dir. Schapper

Gottfried Schapper is a small, rather pleasant man, with rather ingenious blue eyes. He had a short beard during his residence in Augsburg; this may, however, be due to the fact that C.I.C. pulled him in without giving him time to bring a razor with him. He is a widower with one son who was eleven years old on May 30. He was desperately anxious to give us all the assistance he could; the reason for this was, he explained, a sincere desire to cooperate with the Allies for the promotion of world peace. Had his arrest taken place while the fighting was still going on, he assured us that he would not have uttered a word. Unfortunately, in spite of his desire to help, he appears, like all the heads of organisations examined by TICOM personnel, to have had almost no knowledge of details. One gets the impression that he was rather old-world, and that this had its effect on his organisation. He rather lived in the last war, in fact. On the other hand, he claims that he wished his organisation to become a general intelligence bureau at the commencement of this war, but that his competitors - the Foreign Office and OKW/Chi - refused to cooperate. He professed a willingness to cooperate with Oberst Ketteler, which he said was not reciprocated. Perhaps the fact that this was Göring's private cryptographic bureau had something to do with the lack of cooperation.

A few points are worth noticing:

- 1) Intercept stations were located at Lübben and Templin near Berlin, at Breslau, Köln, Konstanz, and Eutin.
- 2) The Forschungsamt did not listen to press broadcasts.
- 3) They always took new stations until they had enough traffic to identify them; if they were service stations the information was passed to the appropriate branch of the service concerned.
- 4) Paetzel's department (Abt. 6) was entirely research and dealt with Sonderverfahren.
- 5) The other departments were divided according to "language families".
- 6) The Hollerith machinery found in Kaufbeuren was used by Hauptabteilung IV but "only for statistics".
- 7) The chief effort of the department was on diplomatic, though a lot of commercial traffic was read, "as the codes were easy". As to cryptographic success, details were lacking. They did very well with Polish and Turkish, and with the smaller countries, e.g. Balkans, and South America. They had no success at all with Russian, "not as much as they would have liked" with British and U.S. They took Jap, but were only occasionally able to break it, and had only one Jap decoder.



Until 1944 Rentschler was the French expert in Abteilung 11, in 1944 he became the head of Abteilung 13. While still in Berlin Abteilung 13 employed about 80 people. After the various moves and Armed Forces drafts, however, they were only 16 men and 4 girls left in all of Main Abteilung V when it reached Rosenheim.

Material which reached Main Abteilung V for evaluation came either from Abteilung 5 or Main Abteilung IV, depending upon whether it had been received in plain language or in code or cipher. Material from the Decoding Abteilung came to Abteilung V already translated while clear text material came as it was received, except for Japanese and other non-European languages which also were translated into German by experts. Abteilung 10 included 5 or 6 translators of European languages and Rentschler said that nearly everyone, at least in his section, could handle French and English.

Most of the material sent to Main Abteilung V was obtained from plain language sources; foreign radio, foreign press, telephone and telegraph messages to and from both foreign and occupied countries, and internal communications. The quantity of decoded material varied with the various sections of Main Abteilung V: in Abteilung 11 perhaps 30% of the total was decoded traffic, 40 % clear text and another 30% from radio broadcasts and the press; in Abteilung 12 a considerably smaller percentage consisted of decoded material; in Abteilung 13 only about 7-8% of the total came from decodes.

By agreement with OKW absolutely no military codes and ciphers were handled by RLM/FA. When asked how such material could be distinguished from that which was their commitment, Rentschler stated that the initial group indicated the sort of material. Most of the decoded traffic was diplomatic and there was in addition some success with commercial codes. Rentschler insisted that nothing could be done with top-grade Russian, English and American diplomatic codes. French (Vichy period; de Gaulle uses Allied codes and consequently his diplomatic traffic is not read) was the easiest to break, since Vichy changed its code only about every four weeks. Some success with Italian, Turkish and Japanese. None with Sweden. The Swiss used hardly any diplomatic wireless channels. Second, third and fourth grade English diplomatic could be read but produced nothing. Communications between British consul in Cairo and London could be read.

Most decoded traffic was read about 2-3 days after it was sent, with some up to a week old. Apparently only Japanese traffic was read up to 4 or 5 weeks old. Rentschler professed almost complete ignorance of the workings of Main Abteilung IV, which was guarded by very rigid and strictly enforced security regulations.

The finished product of Main Abteilung V was automatically sent to Goering and by agreement to whatever other agencies were concerned with the particular matter in hand. The Foreign Office received quite a lot of the output, as did Dr. Speer.

Rentschler was very cooperative and apparently had no reservations about telling all he knew.

Min. Rat Seifert apparently remained in Berlin and Rentschler knows nothing about his present whereabouts or whether a northern branch of RLM/FA was ever set up. Mews and Kurzbach were in Kaufbeuren when Rentschler departed for Rosenheim but had left there when the latter walked back to Kaufbeuren a few days later to get his clothing. Rautenkranz is in the Seventh Army cage in Augsburg.

On May 31 Rentschler was taken up on specific points of the previous day's interrogation. Abteilungen 11-13 reported on an average 80 messages a day, including decodes and P/L (Klartext). They were given all texts, and then separated reportable from non-reportable. Abteilung 11, the one dealing with traffic of interest to the Foreign Office, reported perhaps 20-30 messages a day. This is interesting in view of

Schapper's statement that this office put their main cryptographic effort into diplomatic ciphers.

Questioned about success on British diplomatic ciphers, P/W was very vague. He had in fact seen only one message from the British consul in Cairo to London, and could not say whether this traffic had been read regularly. As to U.S. diplomatic, he knew that quite a lot of the traffic from Harrison in Berne to Washington had been read, he believed up till recently. His impression is that this did not include the highest grade information, but messages about, for example, the situation in Germany, signed but not written by Harrison. He does not think that any other links were read. They also read British and U.S. commercial messages, some concerned with ship's movements. These were mainly about individual ships; convoy information was not dealt with by his office.

IV. Translation of write-up by Schapper. The 'Research Bureau'
(Forschungsamt, abbreviated FA)

Augsburg 1.6.45.

1) Founded: April 1933

2) Reasons for the foundation: My work in the Cipher Bureau of the Reichswehr Ministry (1927-1933) had shown me the incompetence of the methods employed there, so that I, with several colleagues, resigned from it and proposed to GOERING the formation of an Intelligence Bureau for the Reich Government that should be free of departmental ties and extraneous influences.

3) Name: GOERING consented, and only requested the camouflaging of the bureau under the name Reichsluftfahrtministerium-Forschungsamt (Reich Air Ministry, Research Bureau). My request, that we should however, be independent of the Air Ministry, was granted: the Bureau became independent, with its own administration and establishment; it was also not subordinated to the Reich Air Ministry (Staatssekretär MILCH), but allocated for supervision to Staatssekretär KOERNER of the Prussian Ministry of State; finance was regulated directly from the Treasury (Finanzhof).

4) Nature of the Bureau: The Bureau was consequently a civilian institution. For reasons of security a small number of its officials was put into G.A.F. uniform as Armed Forces Officials for the duration of the war. This was done only with those officials who had to cooperate with outside authorities.

The Research Bureau (FA) restricted itself to intercepting and processing signals that could not be intercepted by technical devices. In this, it did not participate in the procuring of military intelligence, (which was the responsibility of OKW), nor with intelligence from agents, as I held agent material to be too unreliable and likely to prejudice our own reliable intelligence.

5) Organisation of the FA: Accordingly, the FA was composed as follows:

Organisation and Tasks:

a) Director (Chef): Management of official business.

Section (Hauptabt.) I: Organisation: Established Personnel; Administration.

Subsection (Abt.) 1: Organisation: internal and external security; secrecy; A.R.P.

Subsection 2: Admin.

Section II: Personnel.

Subsection 3: Personnel (unestablished).

Section III: Interception and signals routine.

Subsection 4: Employment of interception forces, interception planning and interception tasks; control of interception routine.

Subsection 5: Sorting of intercepted signals and their distribution to Sections IV and V (q.v.)

Section IV: Codes and Ciphers; Deciphering.

Subsection 6: Scientific preparation of working documents and basic principles for deciphering.

Subsection 7: Anglo-American and other related languages and cipher procedures.

Subsection 8: Slavonic ditto

Subsection 9: Oriental languages and cipher procedures. Also other languages.

Section V: Exploitation of signals; routing.

Subsection 10: Distribution, duplication, registering and filing of signals.

Subsection 11: Intelligencing for foreign policy.

Subsection 12: Intelligencing for economic policy.

Subsection 13: Intelligencing for home policy. Other intelligencing, e.g. Propaganda, Food, Labour, Traffic (i.e. railways, etc), Police.

Section VI: Signals Technology.

Subsection 14: Development and supply of equipment.

Subsection 15: Maintenance technology.

b) Liaison stations. The FA had one liaison officer with each of the following - the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Economics, the Propaganda Ministry, OKW, and the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA). The duties of these liaison officers were to deliver to these authorities the relevant signals from us, to make any necessary explanation of them, and to receive instructions.

c) Outstations: In the Reich, and also in occupied territory, there were the Intercept Stations, which were grouped together by districts under Control Stations. These included:-

W/T Intercept Stations

Broadcast Intercept Stations

Telegram	"	"	(Landline intercept)
Telephone	"	"	{ " " }
T.P.	"	"	{ " " }

Postal Censorship Stations.

d) The tasks of the FA are clear from Paragraph 5, a to c; they therefore consisted of: Interception, Processing (Deciphering, Exploitation) and publication to relevant Reich authorities of signals having importance for diplomacy, external and home policy, economic policy, cultural, propaganda, food, labour, traffic and police policy, these signals being interceptable by technical devices.

Signals thus obtained were processed in a strictly objective manner and passed to the relevant Reich authorities. It was no part of the duties of the Bureau to make independent deductions, to estimate the value of the contents, or to make recommendations for action.

The landline portion of the work (telephone, telegram and letter interception) was, on my recommendation, handed over at the beginning of 1945 to the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA), as in course of time political interception had become much less important than police interception on account of the military and traffic situation.

6) Development of the FA. This did not proceed in accordance with the original plan. It soon became evident that the unification of all intelligence services (especially the principal ones, e.g. that of the Foreign Office and the Political Intelligence Service of OKW) with that of the FA was being wrecked by the departmental interests of these authorities. (Translator's note: a few words seem to have been omitted from the following sentence, but the sense is clearly as follows). Thus there arose a constant and very harmful competition between these, which had the specific effect of preventing the FA from developing into a centralised intelligence organisation for the Reich High Command, such as are possessed by America and Great Britain, and thus the FA could not take its proper place alongside the Foreign Office and OKW, as was originally expected.

1933-43: FA in Berlin.

December 43 - January 45:--after the Bureau was bombed out in Berlin--in Breslau.

February 45 - April 45, in Kaufbeuren or on the march, disbanding of the Bureau, destruction of archives and documents, dispersal of remainder of employees. A part of the FA had remained in the north of the Reich.

Signed: SCHAPPER.

Forschungsamt (Translation)

Curriculum Vitae of the former Ministerialdirektor GOTTFRIED SCHAPPER.

Born 16.12.1888 in Groszmooringen, Kreis Stendal, son of the Evangelical pastor Dr. Karl Schapper.

Schools. Elementary school, Classical High School, matriculation certificate 1910.

1910; Fahnenjunker and Lieut. in Railway Regt. No. 2.

1913; Transferred to Signals.

1914-1918; in the First World War: O.C. Heavy W/T Station 15 in the West with AOK 5 (Crown Prince).

In the East with G.K. X (Ennich)

" 1 Inf. Div. (Konta)

" 11 Bavarian Inf. Div. (Kneupel)

" AOK Linsingen.

" " Southeast (Balkans) with O.K. Mackensen as O.C. Deciphering Station Balkans.

1916-1917: O.C. wireless Section High Command of the Army at G.H.Q. and Director of the Cryptographic Bureau (Geheimwissenschaftl. Abt.) of the High Command of the Army. (Interception, Deciphering, Intelligencing of all military and political signals interceptable by technical devices.)

1918: Divisional Signals Commander with various divisions in the West.

1919: Discharged with rank as Captain.

1919-1920: Married; fell into the hands of revolutionary swindlers, without work or food, harried by communists, sold newspapers and other things on the streets; did odd jobs to ward off starvation.

1920: Secretary of the National Society of Berlin for Rescuing the Reich from the Revolution. Took part in the Kapp-Ludendorff Putsch; persecuted by communists; moved to Munich.

1920-1927: in Munich. Various jobs as business manager of National organisations, of clubs, businesses and newspapers.

1920-1923: Member of the N.S.D.A.P., resigned after the Putsch of 1923.

1927-1933: In Berlin. Administrative Officer and Head of Department in the Cryptographic Bureau of the Reichswehr Ministry. Resigned 1933, as I could not agree with the thoroughly incompetent methods of the Cryptographic bureau. Therefore,

1933-April 1945 I went over to Goering, whom I knew well from the First World War; founding of the Forschungsamt (see my report on the Forschungsamt): Head of Subsection, then Head of Section, and from 1944 director of this Bureau.

1931: joined the Nazi Party, and remained a simple member of it until April 1945.

1933-37 or 38: member of the Allgemeine SS, from which I resigned, as they refused to recognise my Christian philosophy of life.

1934: A son was born to me.

1939-45: Employment of the Forschungsamt in the Second World War, under my direction, first as deputy head, then independently from

1944: at first in Berlin, after the bombing out in Breslau and subsequently in Kaufbeuren.

April 1945: Release and residence in Spellbrunn-Niederwall near Rosenheim.

May: Arrested by CIC, interrogation in Rosenheim, imprisonment and interrogation in Salsburg, then captivity in Augsburg.

Appendix 3

OKL HEADQUARTERS, BDM SCHULE at STRUB

On May 12th, Oeser, Rood, Eldridge and Coolidge paid a visit to the BDM Schule at Strub which had been the last active H.Q. of OKL. This was now scattered about the school, the Hotel Berchtesgadener Hof and Thumersbach near Zell-am-See. The buildings were bare of all but non-essential papers. In the basements the teleprinter room and telephone exchanges were intact, but all the wheels had been removed from secret teleprinters, of which there were six. The building above the teleprinter basement was in process of being re-occupied by the Chief of Staff of O.K.L., General Koller, and his various heads of departments and aides, all of whom had good telephone communications with Kesselring, Martini, von Winter, and other high staff officers in the Berchtesgadener Hof and their staffs in Thumersbach, Saalfelden and Alm.

During the preliminary search, Major RAWISCH, signals officer, appeared. His first move was - very politely - to foil us in the act of liberating three neat little Mercedes-Benz, by producing written authority for possessing and using them. This having been achieved - for no-one in, or even attached to, TICOM would disregard orders signed by Kesselring (F.M.) and stamped by the 101st Airborne Division! - we settled down to the more hum-drum business of interrogation. Rawisch was trying to rebuild the shattered signals organisation. A policeman before he joined the Luftwaffe, he was well aware of the advantages of displaying courteous cooperation; but he knew little about the fate of the Sturgeon wheels.

When the party emerged from the basement, Eldridge and Coolidge went off to inspect the other buildings. Rood and Oeser were intercepted by General Koller, who wished to enlist the help of "the first Airforce officers he had seen". Specifically, he wanted us to re-assemble his staff "so that I can start work again" "How can I work without a staff?", he asked, not unreasonably.

Now we wanted to know just that; where was the staff, in particular, where were Obstlttn. Kienitz (Intelligence) and Obstlttn. Friedrich (Y-Service)? Koller told us. He also telephoned General Martini (Director-General of G.A.F. Signals) about the missing drums; was referred to Martini's C. of S., Oberst Morgenstern, summoned him and interrogated him on our behalf. It appeared that one, Hptm. Krause, had been ordered to hide the drums, and had last been seen standing forlornly on the road in the path of the American advance. Rawisch showed us some more T52 machines stored in a massive concrete bunker. These too, had been made unusable. Gen. Koller also revealed the location of the BRANDENBURG trains.

Rood and Oeser thereupon set out for Zell-am-See. They went by a road through the mountains, and, taking the jeep over rocks, meadows and snowdrifts to circumnavigate a blown bridge, got through without meeting road patrols, and thus remained in ignorance of the order by the 101st Div. that no one was allowed into the "German" area.

(+Footnote. Our security cover was that the conditions of capitulation forbade the use of all cypher equipment. Rood on behalf of 6 AG and Oeser on behalf of "G.H.Q." were inspecting various H.Q.'s to see that this condition was observed; but about cyphers as such they appeared rather ignorant.)

GERMAN HEADQUARTERS, ZELL AREA, May 13th-16th.

The whole of this area was under German control with rather casual supervision by the 101st Airborne Division through the 356th Parachute Regiment. OKL, with its intelligence and various departments, was at Thumersbach, where there were also bodies from the Vienna Institute of Physics and Physiology and of the Vienna police. The main object of the visit had been to locate Oberstleutnante Kienitz and Friedrich, who were duly found after a certain amount of German unwillingness to say which house they occupied had been overcome.

It was clear that advance information of the impending visit by R.A.F. and Air Corps officers had been telephoned to them. No documents were found other than a small personal collection of Russian Air and Army order of battle and appreciations retained by Kienitz, and after placing these officers in the custody of General von Criegern (Gen. Qu. O.K.L.), Oeser and Rood left for Saalfelden to inspect the Brandenburg trains. Two of the trains contained new and intact T 52 E's. It was ordered that they should be dismantled and placed under guard by 356 P. R.

Appendix 3 (continued)

From Saalfelden, the trail led to Alm, where the main staffs of O.B. West were found. The chief Signals Officer of O.B. West, General Würster, very kindly supplied the information that FuFe Trupp 19 (known to constant readers as Jellyfish) was located in some farmhouses at Dorfheim. Jellyfish was duly found, ready to function, curiously enough within a few hundred yards of the Brandenburg trains. After a rapid inspection and having taken photographs of SZ 42 to the undisguised dismay of the officer in charge, Oberlt. Wurm, the spearhead withdrew to consider further tactics.

The situation was strange in that the Germans appeared in relatively self-possessed control of the situation and that the 101st. Div. was reluctant to permit entry into the area, let alone removal of bodies or equipment. In Berchtesgaden itself, Kesselring, Koller and Co. were busy 'building up their staffs', quite unconvinced that the war was irrevocably at an end. Koller and his staff officers were all eager to help us, as they believed that we wanted their cooperation against the Russians. At Thumersbach, and even in the heart of the 'occupied' zone in Berchtesgaden, considerable truculence was manifested by some officers when we walked into their midst. They were all armed, had their own Tommy-gunned sentries at the entrances, and their own transport. Koller was difficult to contact again, as he was constantly en route for the Zell area and as far afield as Kitzbühl and Wasserburg.

We outstared - and on one occasion shouted down - the truculence. But the problem of security began to assume menacing proportions; and the problem of doing a Carter Paterson on the Jellyfish station baffled us, since Diesel trucks cannot be jeeped cross-country around broken bridges. The moot point was: who would shoot us first - the Germans, the Americans or TICOM?

On May 15th Oeser went to Augsburg to send a long report to TICOM. Rood turned from rustling to honesty, used the authority of his 6 A.G. shoulder flash and persuaded the 101st. G-2 to let him move three of the Jellyfish trucks as far as Berchtesgaden.

On the same day, Shaef ordered all personnel, materiel and documents to be 'frozen' in the area; and the Supreme Commander ordered all German Officers to leave the fleshpots of the Berchtesgadener Hof for the Strub Barracks. (There they celebrated their reunion so well that two officers had to be sent to hospital with broken legs, and others remained sotto blotto for 36 hours and could not be interrogated)

Between May 15th and 18th, TICOM sent an agitate of signals reversing previous policy as to the disposal of POW's, and various organisations moved into the area to unfreeze documents and equipment. On the 18th, Shaef Air Staff sent a mission under G/C Scott-Farnie to investigate and report. G/C Scott/Farnie spent several hours in consultation with Team I and intervened on its behalf with Gen. Harper. On May 20th, Oeser flew back with the mission to Rheims. On the 16th, the rest of the Jellyfish trucks, receivers and transmitters with operating personnel and mechanics had also been taken off by Rood and Oeser from Dorfheim, and the whole convoy under Major Tester sent to Augsburg. (See Appendix 7 for the rest of the story) The visit to Rheims made it possible to have orders sent to 7th Army, with which the convoy was at last able to proceed to the U.K.

From now on matters moved on a relatively even keel, as the diary shows. More documents were found, and the BAUDOT equipment caused no such anxiety as the Jellyfish had. A second liaison visit to Shaef - by now at Frankfurt - enabled TICOM to get the four boxes of Sigint documents which had been impounded by an USSTAF team. Agreement was reached with Air and Army Sigint in the posting of a permanent TICOM representative to Shaef to follow up information beginning to come in from all sides.

Appendix 4.

THE BERGHOF.

Places visited

Bormann's office
Hitler's house
Hitler's air raid shelter
Goering's Adjutantur
Goering's house

Information on

Goering's air raid shelter
Goering's Secretariat (Stabsamt)

TRO's

Maj. J. Eldridge
Lt. (j. g.) J. P. Coolidge.

BORMANN'S OFFICE

In Bormann's office were found various Fernschreiber, three of type Alpha 32, one T 37d, one T 37e, and one T 37f, and one T 52c. All these were badly damaged. There were also a Siemens Fernschreiber T 52 (no initial) which appeared to be in good condition but was crated up, and an unidentified machine called Tarnator manufactured by Ernst Schaezler, Reform Büro-Maschinen, München 15, Goethestrasse 68. These were not removed pending study by Major Tester.

The office included miscellaneous unclassified files and papers, such as records of real estate owned by members of the staff, digests of news, personal records of staff members. No papers of any Sigint interest were found.

Members of the T- force guarding the office said that it was used as a secretariat for Bormann and as a press relations office. The building had been designed as a guest house for the neighbouring hotel and Bormann only occupied a small portion of it-- three or four rooms.

HITLER'S HOUSE

This building had been thoroughly gutted by bombing, fire and looters. Only one room contained any items of interest. This was a storeroom on the ground floor slightly in front of the house. It was filled with furniture, books and papers. The books were general reference works and several architectural folios. The only papers noted were portions of scientific treatises (in one case a doctoral dissertation) on medicine and chemistry. No classified documents were noted.

HITLER'S AIR RAID SHELTER

In the hill behind Hitler's house was an extensive air raid shelter. This consisted of a core containing several apartments, laboratories, a large telephone switchboard and store rooms as well as numerous long entrance passage-ways. The German caretaker at Goering's Adjutantur stated that the shelter was designed solely for the occupants of Hitler's house and that Goering had his own air raid shelter. The telephone exchange, however, was so large that it must have been designed for some sort of headquarters.

Some of the long passageways had been used as stores for military clothing, ammunition and food. The store rooms in the main portion were well stocked with food. Others contained a large collection of classical victrola records, and large gold picture frames from most of which the pictures had been removed. There was also a library of fine books, again chiefly reference and architectural. There was evidence that military personnel had occupied the shelters.

No equipment or documents of Sigint interest were noted.

Appendix 4 (continued)

GÖRING'S ADJUTANTUR

This building was in relatively good condition. It was occupied by several families. According to the German caretaker who claimed to have been in residence since 1937, it was designed to accommodate guests and the servants for Göring's house. There were no radio installations and no telephone switchboard. There was, however, an unopened safe, said by the caretaker to belong to General Bodenschatz.

GÖRING'S HOUSE

This was relatively modest and heavily bombed. No official documents or communications equipment was noticed, and there was no evidence to suggest that the building had ever contained such material.

GÖRING'S AIR RAID SHELTER

The caretaker stated that Göring had his own air raid shelter with an entrance from the Adjutantur. This was said to be empty. Since Göring and all his personnel were under arrest at the time of the raids, the statement was accepted.

GÖRING'S STABSAMT

The caretaker also stated that Göring's secretarial work was all done at the Stabsamt in Berchtesgaden. This is now occupied by a company of the 327th Airborne Regiment.

Appendix 5

THE FORMER REICHSKANZLEI

May 13th, 1945

Places visited

Former Reichskanzlei
Goering's Stabsant

TRO

Lt. (j.g.) J. Coolidge

FORMER REICHSKANZLEI

The headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division were visited. These were said to have been at one time the headquarters of Field Marshal Keitel and were also referred to as the former Reichskanzlei.

Colonel Danahy, G-2 of the 101st, stated that no papers of any sort had been found when the division occupied the building. However, it had previously been occupied by French troops and the 3rd U.S. division.

Major Handelsmann, acting communication officer for the division, stated that while there was an extensive wire system, including an automatic and a manual switchboard, there were no radio installations of any sort and no teleprinters had been found. He expressed surprise that no code and cypher machinery of any kind had been found and no communications documents.

Beneath the headquarters was a long passage winding down into the hill and leading to a large air-raid shelter. There were other entrances to this shelter from the bottom of the hill, one open and one locked. None of the entrances was guarded, and although not many people were currently visiting the place, it was still being looted. A lieutenant colonel going out with a large pile of books and documents remarked: "I consider everything down there legitimate loot."

The cellars contained three or four apartments, a large telephone exchange, a large teleprinter room and a large kitchen. In the corridor outside the teleprinter room was a Fernschreiber type 37e, somewhat damaged. In the teleprinter room was a Fernschreiber type 52c with wheels badly damaged. The wheels were too badly broken to be removed. Against the wall near the Fernschreiber was a Fernschreiberanschlussgerät. Next this was a locked box. It appeared to contain another Fernschreiber similar to the one which had been damaged. Although looters had free access to the cellars it seemed unlikely that the machinery would be disturbed.

In the main corridors and in some of the apartments were boxes containing books, personal belongings and a vast quantity of stationery, files and papers of all sorts. The papers which were examined were in some cases highly classified (Geheim and Geheime Kommandosache) and dealt with questions of army administration. There was also a record of Hitler's movements day by day, and in some cases hour by hour, extending back into the mid-1930's. There was also a file of Dr. Lammer's personal correspondence, a report on the four-year plan and an enormous mass of similar material all in complete confusion. Unfortunately it was not possible to remove any of these, since a representative of T-Force appeared along with some members of the Control Commission. Many of the books were the personal property of members of the staff. Others were official publications of an administrative nature, such as many volumes of legal digests.

APPENDIX FIVE (continued)

Although there was some evidence that the apartments had been lived in, they had not been occupied long or by many people. Some of the papers were as recent as the autumn of 1944, but they all appeared to be dead. Nothing of recent operational interest was found, and no documents of any Sig Int interest. Almost all the files appeared to belong to the Reichkanzlei.

GOERING'S STABSAMT


A brief visit was paid to Goering's Stabsamt. This was being occupied by a company headquarters. Many of the rooms were locked and many of the key personnel were not available, so it was not fully examined.

One of the rooms near the Divisional Judge Advocate General's office contained an undamaged Fernschreiber in a case, complete with wheels. It was type 52b of 1941. Next it was a similar case, but locked. The serial numbers on the cases suggested that this, too, was about the same age. Beside them was a Fernschreiberanschlussgerät. The label read:

-G-

Fernschreiberanschlussgerät
No. 11 T bk 36a/11 T Sh 8209/11
100/200 V 50 per.
20/1,0 A
1942

This room was hard to reach and the machinery seemed to be safe for the present.



Appendix 6.

On 15/5 LV1000 (landline centre) was visited. This stands in a large house next to Hans Geiger Berchtesgaden. As was to be expected, it contained a large telephone switchboard room, a large multi-channel carrier-frequency room with apparatus of the MB8 type, a battery charging room.

For telegraphy, there were in the operating room six secret T/Ps of the T52D-E type (which were removed) and one of the T52B (modified?) type (also removed). Strip machines and start-stop apparatus which plugged into the T/Ps were also removed and despatched to U.K.

There were in addition several open T/Ps, which were of no interest to Ticom. Room was found for what is believed to be a stroboscope of a type unfamiliar to the writer.

The actual Fernschreibanschlussgeraet and the W.T.40 racks were not despatched, as it is thought that sufficient data on these is already available.

It would be possible to get most of this gear working again in a very short time, and, should this be considered advisable, it is recommended that German engineers be used for this purpose.

Documents were very few on this site - a few booklets on individual items of equipment were found and taken away. Sufficient other documents were on the spot to prove that this was in fact the site of LV.1000.

An overflow shed was filled with multi-channel T/P gear, and two Heavy Power Units A for emergency mains supply were located in a second shed.

Very close by in the Hotel Vierjahreszeiten, Berchtesgaden, is located the High Speed Morse Station of LV.1000. Equipment here was of the type one would expect. KWEA and LWEA receivers, two Pack-receivers B for reception with their power-supply units, keying plugs, W.T. apparatus of the usual type for keying several transmitters at a time per landline connection with the transmitting stations. Two locations were shown on the W.T. rack panels; one was Schloss Klessheim; the other was "Fridolfing". Once again, documents were very few - enough again was found to show that this was the high speed morse station of LV.1000 - a log book of the station and a list of promotion for personnel of 5 LN Regt ObdL were found and taken.

Two Enigma Uhr were removed. A type-printing enigma was also there, but, on being advised that this was known, it was not removed.

Nothing unusual in the arrangement of the rooms, which were all on the first floor of the building, was in evidence.

There was, however, a room occupied by a Naval liaison section, and a booklet of instructions for "Schluessel M" was removed from it. It is interesting to note that the type-printing Enigma was also labelled "Schluessel M". The machine was identical in every respect with ordinary Enigmas, having three wheels and an Umkehrwalze B, with a small box-like apparatus fitted on the right centre of the machine which produced the encoded text.

A large number of Enigma Uhr were piled up in the corner of the cipher room.

Quantities of spare cable etc. were stored in a covered courtyard within the Hotel.

Appendix 7.

Transportation of O.B. West Non-Morse Station
(Jellyfish) with attached personnel.

(Major Tester and Lt. Levenson)

We left Berchtesgaden on 16 May at 1330 hours. The party included 11 E.M. P.W.'s, 1 German officer, Major Tester in charge, and Lt. Levenson. The German P.W.'s were driving six 5-ton Diesel trucks. Maj. Tester rode in the first truck and Lt. Levenson in the last. We stopped for two hours at Bad Reichenhall to pick up Diesel oil, and finally got started at about 1700 hours.

Our first destination was Augsburg, but since we left so late, this was out of the question. We got to Munich at midnight and after a series of telephone calls, we located Lt. Col. Frankel, who found a house for us. The prisoners slept in the attic; we were downstairs. We got started early the next morning and arrived in Augsburg about noon. Here we contacted Col. Quinn, G-2 7th Army, who told us we could not proceed without orders. This involved a delay of four days. The prisoners were placed in the Seventh Army Interrogation Centre, and we were billeted at the Kaiserhof Hotel in Augsburg. The time was used to have the prisoners service their trucks, refuel and do minor repairs. We got to know them a little better and it became fairly obvious that they were co-operative and unlikely to make any trouble. The orders came through on Monday; they were issued by 7th Army on authority of a cable from Staff Forward. (See Appendix 3).

We left Augsburg Tuesday morning and arrived at Heidelberg about 1800 that night. The prisoners were housed at the 6th Army Group depot. They filled their tanks to the astonishment of the natives and finally the prisoners had to be removed. We got started again early the next morning. There was a long delay at Wiesbaden, where we had to pick up a way-bill for passage to the U.K. This took longer than expected, and we did not get to Rheinbach (15th Army Interrogation Centre) until 2300 hours. There were other delays caused by water getting into the Diesel system. One of these occurred in a town and the greatest difficulty was keeping the people away from the prisoners.

Since we arrived so late, it was decided to spend two days at Rheinbach to give the drivers some rest. There was a Diesel dump nearby; we took advantage of this and had the prisoners fill their tanks, so that we now had sufficient fuel to take the trucks to the U.K. There was a little trouble here. The prison housed only political prisoners, S.S. men, Gauleiters etc. These people got fairly rough treatment, which was also given to our men. Since they had been well-behaved and we were dependent on their being in good health, we interceded on their behalf, and they were treated well for the rest of the stay.

Our next stop was Brussels. Here the Town Major found a place for the prisoners at St. Jean Barracks, which had been taken over by the British Army. We stayed here for two days, during which the arrangements for passage to the U.K. were made. The British major was extremely helpful. We also called Ticom, who were informed of the approximate time of our arrival at Tilbury.

We left Brussels very early Sunday morning and arrived in Ostend at 1100 hours. The trucks were loaded on an L.C.T. We spent the night in the Thames Estuary, arriving at Tilbury about noon on Monday. Here some British MP's took the prisoners to Kempton Park. Six British drivers took the trucks to GOCS. There was some difficulty going through Belgium caused by the appearance of Germans driving their own trucks. No casualties resulted, except that Lt. Levenson was hit by a tin can heaved by an irate Belgian woman.

Appendix 8.

Glaserbach, visited May 17th. Former
S.S. headquarters, now used as repatri-
ation centre.

Party: Campaigne
Carter
Norland
Maxwell

The Nachrichtendienst had been in the basement of the main building. There was evidence of T52d-e (cipher attachment), but none of the machines themselves. There were two safes, which were burned open with the help of Capt. Jones of 3253 RI Company. They were bare of all documents. A few miscellaneous documents were picked up, including two files belonging to Ic.

Appendix 9

Schloss Klessheim, visited 17 May;
former Gästehaus des Führers, now occupied
by G.O.C. 3rd Div.

Party: Campaigne
Carter

In the basement where is a section of the Kanzlei dealing with awards of medals. A large card-index of receivers of awards exists there. It is not certain whether this is complete. The files and dossiers were in considerable disorder, and it is understood that a previous T-force party had visited the place for a period of four days, possibly occasioning the disorder.

In a structure outside the walls of the Schloss, possibly a former stable, were housed the following transmitters:

1. Two S51924/2
2. Two Lorenz SL08805 1.5 kw sets
3. One Transmitter Radioslavia 1.4 kw set
4. Two Lorenz 763724/1
5. Three AS59 200 watt transmitters
6. One 100 watt long wave LS100/108 transmitter.

Descriptive booklets of some of these were removed. This equipment was used by the high-speed Morse station of LV1000 in Hotel Vierjahreszeiten in Berchtesgaden (possibly amongst others).

APPENDIX 10

Fridolfing
Surheim, visited 18th May

(1) Fridolfing

In a field close to the town of Fridolfing there was a collection of wooden sheds. Some of them evidently formed the barrack accomodation for soldiers working the Sägefisch Receiving Station of LV 1000. This identity was checked by a label found on a box in the main hut. This label was the only document of the slightest interest in the place.

A few receivers of the E 52b type together with special sets for combining the output of up to three sets lay on the floor in various stages of dismemberment. Rhombic aerials were still up in the fields around the single wooden shanty which comprsed working quarters of the station. Pieces of test gear, TP connecting sets, covers of secret TP's and open TP's all lay strewn around, but the place had been so well and truly destroyed by the Germans (or looted), that nothing which remained was of use to TICOM.

It would therefore appear that LV1000 WT TP reception took place at Fridolfing and the transmissions were in all likelihood made from the same station as the high-speed morse service at Schloss Klessheim, which contained W.T. land line equipment (See Appendix 9).

Three heavy power units A 15 KVA were found outside another shed and had no doubt provided the emergency power supply for the station, being the usual equipment for this purpose.

(2) Surheim

After a long search fragments of a communications center were found at Surheim near the railroad station. This too had been so extensively damaged that any reconstruction of what had been there is unreliable. A German ex-soldier working on the land near one of the wooden sheds volunteered the information that this had been a center with twenty-five operating positions. There were odd remnants of T/P and W/T T/P lying around all thoroughly damaged. The hut itself which apparently was the operating part had been so destroyed that only the foundation piles were visible at ground level. It seems impossible that this should have been done by looters. It is much more likely that either just before or just after the Armistice the Germans removed most of what was in it.

About two hundred meters away in a shed which still had its roof on were several receivers of the KWEA type. They were hopelessly mangled and other odd pieces of equipment were lying about with them. The room could never have housed many receivers at any time. It is fairly certain that some other activity than W/T T/P reception was carried on at this site. The usual rhombic arrays for Sägefisch reception were still standing. There were traces of aerial feeder cables leading into the shack. Furthermore, the shack was connected by underground cable to the site of the T/P operating hut. One remarkable lacuna was the complete absence of any evidence of the large telephone exchange which was expected to be here (the site of DV Alpen). This was the more remarkable in that a German telephone operator working in the exchange in the neighboring town of Laufen knew DV Alpen as a telephone exchange located in barracks near the railroad station at Surheim. Inquiries from most cooperative inhabitants around the railroad station convinced the Target Reporting Officers that there were no other barracks near the Surheim railroad station.

Communications Train

While proceeding towards our first target just beyond Laufen a train was noticed standing on the railroad tracks bedecked with what appeared to be teleprinter tape. Upon investigation this proved to consist of cars for transporting personnel, freight cars containing unused communications stationery,

one car containing communications documents and one car containing communications machinery. The latter was of no TICOM interest though a few technical leaflets were removed from it.

The documents which were scattered about the track as well as lying in complete disorder within one car suggested that this train was employed to evacuate the intercept station at Treuenbrietzen. These documents varied in date from 1938-1945. Most of them, however, were of little TICOM interest being chiefly indents and receipts for equipment together with technical periodicals and reports of a confidential degree of security. The scattering of the documents around the train suggests that once again the more important documents had been removed. The train, itself, was undamaged, though of course without an engine.

T.R.O's

- Capt. Stone
- Capt. Carter
- Lt. Whitaker
- Lt. Lively
- Lt. (jg) Coolidge

APPENDIX 11

Documents buried by RLM general stab 2 Abt. [IIa] near
Schloss Hubertus. Inspected May 19th

Lt. Frank, liaison officer of 101 Div at Strub BDM Schule, called to say he had a German colonel who knew where documents were buried. This Obest Ruhser obligingly showed us the spot and furnished a Major Gerhard Müller and crew to dig them up. They were buried behind the barracks formerly occupied by the Obest as headquarters, a recreation center of the German Railways. There were eight boxes, which were removed to Strub for opening. They were all the secret documents of the personnel (officers) section of RLM and dealt mostly with personnel and correspondence (including signals). These documents are now held by Capt. PFORZHEIMER (USSTAF)

APPENDIX 12

Targets explored Salzburg area
28 May

Party: Campaigne Whitaker
Carter Coolidge

- (1) Hallein: Signals equipment dumps includes Enigmas and accessories, T52'e, SZ43's, no documents.
- (2) Fuschl See: on west end of lake is summer home of von Ribbentrop. Radio equipment had been locked up by Mil. Govern. Not followed further.
- (3) St Wolfgang: "Naval establishment" turned out to be training school for boys.
- (4) 1 PW Cage in Salzburg: talked with GROBE, SD man, on chemical industries (See Appendix 12)

APPENDIX 13

Interrogation of Martin Grobe, May 29, 1945

A message had been received from Major Dunn with regard to a certain Martin Grobe (formerly Goldschmidt), a member of the SS, who had been arrested by the XVth Corps and was being held at Salzburg. The prisoner was supposed to be a cryptographer and was said to have experimented with secret inks. Accordingly, Capt. Carter, Lt. Cdr. Campaigne, Lts. Whitaker and Coolidge interrogated him on May 28 and 29.

The prisoner appeared to have no TICOM interest. An unemployed chemist, he had joined the Nazi party in 1933, and the SS in 1935 and had with their help risen to be a company director during the War. He worked principally in the Protectorate, and was interested in experiments with plastics, especially the introduction of Forfurool production into Germany. Although he admitted to having done work with secret ink and in cryptography, in both cases they were a hobby, abandoned many years ago. He had not pursued these interests very far, according to his statements. The TICOM officers reported their findings to G-2 of Corps who agreed to take any further action which might be warranted.

Appendix 14

BAUDOT EQUIPMENT

Report on Gen der Nachr. Aufkl. Gruppe VI

I. Survey

In consequence of a report from C.I.C. 215 Rosenheim, re-transmitted to TICOM by Major Dunn, S.I. 7th U.S. Army, a party consisting of Lt-Cdr. Campaigne, Maj. Rushworth and Capt. Carter visited P/W Camp Bad Aibling on May 21 to interview Uffz. SUSCHOWK.

This P/W had told the camp authorities that certain signals intelligence equipment and documents were in the Pionier-Kaserne at Rosenheim (now occupied by U.S. Ration Dump 507), some in the cellars and some buried.

This equipment, he said, had been used for intercepting and decoding Russian traffics.

P/W, when questioned, explained that he belonged to Gen. der Nachrichtenaufklärung Gruppe VI and that Rosenheim was the most recent location of this unit. Its duty had been the interception of W/T T/P traffic, used between the Russian General Staff (Moscow) and Front Staffs and Armies (but not below that level) and by some commercial links. It transpired that the greater part of the unit was in the same P/W camp.

On May 22nd therefore the same TICOM party, together with Dr. Pickering, returned to Bad Aibling. They collected the unit, twenty in number, took them to Rosenheim and asked them to dig up the buried equipment.

The P/W's complied, and then volunteered to put the equipment in working order. One of the machines was assembled and found to be in good working order.

Next day, all the gear was crated and transported to 7 Army H.Q. together with personnel, with the object of evacuating both to U.K. accompanied by Maj. Rushworth and Lt. Norland.

At Augsburg considerable delay was occasioned, first by a desire on the part of G-2 7 Army to interrogate the prisoners with a view to obtaining information on Russian order of battle, secondly by transport difficulties. However, this gave time for a fairly complete interrogation by Major Rushworth. As a result, a short list could be drawn up to comply with the request by TICOM that only the most essential people should be sent to the U.K.

On June 5th, the equipment, weighing eight tons, accompanied by Maj. Rushworth and Capt. Carter, was flown from München-Ob-erwiesenfeld to Bovingdon.

Six men, one operator, three mechanics, two decoders, were sent by road in charge of Lt. Whitaker, and deposited by him in the gaol at Wiesbaden. These P/W's have been in distinguished company: at Augsburg they lived on the same staircase as Funk and Lammers, and ex-Premier Bardossy; in Wiesbaden they lived in cells near the one which housed Streicher.

Appendix 14 (Cont. I)

II. Appreciation of prisoners

Twenty prisoners, all N.C.O.'s from Gruppe VI, were taken from Bad Aibling to Augsburg. Later Uffz. Erdmann, of Gruppe IV, was added. The party comprised the senior N.C.O. Wachm. Horch, three mechanics, eleven operators, two decoders and four evaluators.

At first they were helpful but afraid. Very soon, however, it was possible to gain their confidence, after which they showed the greatest willingness to cooperate.

Much of this was, of course, owing to the fact that they are all specialists, with a genuine pride in their work. In fact, we are indebted to this pride for the discovery of the station.*

Three deserve particular mention as the most helpful and possibly the most intelligent.

(1) Uffz. Karrenberg before the war was a lecturer at Berlin University in the History of Art and Music. He is also a concert pianist, and has an obvious leaning to mathematics. He joined the army in 1939. As he speaks fluent Russian, he was employed in a wire-tapping detachment when the Russian campaign broke out. At Smolensk he was attached to the intercept service of Heeresgruppe Mitte, and did decoding, T/A and translation. Later he was posted to L.N.A. and employed as a decoder of Russian non-morse transmissions. His main job was to work out daily the letter-scramble which the Russians used, particularly for the P/L commercial traffic. He is quite sure that the Russians considered this, together with their channel scramble, completely secure; but he could decipher it given 2000 letters.

Karrenberg is very intelligent, extremely cooperative, and has a multiplicity of interests. He liked his work, and "believed in working as hard as possible at any job he did."

(2) Uffz. Suschowk, unquestionably the natural leader of the little group of six German prisoners, is an intelligent man. He has a sound knowledge of the apparatus and is familiar with both the intercept operating and evaluation (though in the latter subject on rather general lines).

It was Suschowk's initiative and persistence which put the American authorities and then TICOM on the trail of the apparatus. He is anxious that it should be used, and will not conceal information which is requested of him or withheld information which he considers of value.

(3) Uffz. Hempel is an engineer by profession. He was not only responsible for maintaining the apparatus, but actually helped to build it. This was occasioned by the manpower shortage at Lorenz, Hempel being loaned to Lorenz. Consequently Hempel knows his machinery inside out, and, should the construction of additional models be deemed desirable, would undoubtedly be of great help. He is not a leader like Suschowk, preferring as he does to get on with his job in a quiet and apparently efficient way.

*Also, presumably, Goebbels' propaganda had affected them as it had affected all Germans in the Berchtesgaden area, who believed that they were being kept inviolate for use by the Allies against the Russians (Appendix 3). See also "Introduction" of Appendix 15.

III. Russian W/T T/P traffic, Summary of P.O.W. Interrogations.

(1) Higher command traffic in the Russian army and air force is sent by W/T T/P, but not below army level. Non-morse is also used for commercial purposes, for example, between Moscow and Leningrad, Baku and Sverdlovsk.

(2) Three types of transmission were taken: 9 channel, 6 channel and 2 channel. P.W. took the 9 channel system as an example and traced its development from the early days of 1941-42 when the traffic was recorded on a facsimile machine and read from that.

The Russians successively introduced two modifications:

- a- Impulses of channels 1-2, 3-4 etc. were interchanged (thus leaving the 9th channel clear).
- b- Later, channels 1-4 and 4-8 were scrambled, again leaving channel 9 clear. This was the final modification up to the end of the war.

In 1944 machines were built by Lorenz to take 9 channel traffic. Both types have been brought back from Germany.

P.W. considers that the Russians think the scrambling is secure, but says that a depth of 2000 letters would enable him to reconstruct it even though his old workings have been lost.

(3) Traffic is passed on these links in a variety of different ciphers. What is believed to be of the highest grade of security is sent in a one-time pad, and this is regarded as quite undecipherable. Five-figure traffic (presumably a long subtractor) can be read only when a depth is obtained. Lower-grade codes were read fairly easily. No machine key is used by the Russians except for the scrambled T/P.

As the prisoners and machinery are being brought back to U.K., where the apparatus can be erected and operated, more detailed interrogation was not carried out.

IV. Organisation of Gen. d. Nachr. Aufkl.

(resumé of field interrogation of Oberst Bötzel and Gruppe VI Gen der N.A.)

The office of General der Nachrichtenaufklärung was created towards the end of 1944, one of the results of the passion for reorganisation displayed by Gen. Praun (C.S.O. of OKH). The object was to reduce to method the somewhat inchoate system of Army interception and to establish a methodical and orderly chain of command in the sig. int. service from O.K.H. down to the smallest intercept unit.

Gen. d. N.A. was put in charge of the whole army sig. int. service; this included all interception, deciphering and evaluation units at all levels. They included the K.N.A.'s at Army Group level, N.A.A.'s at Army levels, and smaller units for junior formations.

In addition there was a H.Q. staff attached to the General himself. This consisted of two parts:-

- (1) The administration and organisation of all army sig. int. personnel;
- (2) The sections which intercepted and (if possible) deciphered the higher-grade army traffics which could not be dealt with at a lower level.

The departments were as follows:-

- Gruppe Z: Organisation and Personnel
- Gruppe I: Nachrichtenverbindung (Signals)
- Gruppe II: Westabteilung:- Auswertung für Westfront (Hptm Professor Dr. Thiel). (Evaluation Western front)
- Gruppe III: Ostabteilung:- Auswertung für Ostfront (Hptm Gorzolla). (Evaluation Eastern front)
- Gruppe IV: Entzifferung (deciphering)

Ref 1:- a) Baurat Marquardt 5-fig. cyphers
b) Baurat Pietsch Mathematisches und Maschinenverfahren.
Described as 80% West. Numbered about 25 men and 5-7 women.

Ref 2:- Ost
2a not accurately known but 2b run by Lt. Dettmann and presumably fairly small cyphers.

Ref 3:- Funkbetriebsforschung (radio research).
Alleged to deal with Sonderverfahren (special procedures).

Ref 4:- Hollerith. Stated to be only statistical.

There was also an Ausbildungsreferat (Training Dept.) run by Oberinsp. Kuehn.

- Gruppe V: dealt with
 - Kartei (index)
 - Abkürzungen (abbreviations)
 - Wörterbücher (dictionaries, code books)
 - Beutepapiere (captured documents)
 - Rufzeichensysteme (call-sign systems)

Gruppe VI: Funkfernschreibhorch (radio teleprinter interception)
This took mainly Russian W/T T/P traffic from General Staff down to army level; it also dealt with some English and American traffic.

APPENDIX 15

Interrogation of Prisoners from
Nachrichtenaufklaerungskompanie 626
at BAD AIBLING Prisoner Camp, May 29, 1945

Introductory

On May 23, TICOM Team 1 received from Dr. Pickering a memorandum from John H. Weitz of the Rosenheim C.I.C. Enclosed were two letters from HAUPTS, a prisoner of War at the Bad Aibling Camp. These (one of them in a simple code with the key enclosed) stated that the prisoner and two of his friends were members of Radio intelligence company 626 and wished for an interview. Copies of the letters are included in this report. The object of the group was to offer their services to America or England, as they felt that the German cause was lost and wished to play their part in the struggle against Russia.*

On May 26 Capt. Carter and Lt. (jg) Coolidge visited the Bad Aibling camp and interrogated the three prisoners.

Letters from HAUPTS

Sir:

20.5.45

As specialist in the German Radio Intelligence Service I have information and propositions of some importance for the U.S. Army, which have to be addressed to G-2 or Signal Officer of a higher Hq (army or ac). I encoded them by using an AF-Code I found casually under my papers in the last days. Please check the included message and transmit it to your higher Hq (6th or 21st ac, I guess) as soon as possible. You can be sure that the importance of my letter isn't less extraordinary than the manner of offering it. There is no other possibility to reach you or any American Hq.

Yours faithfully


Ch. H. Haupts

To CG 6th or 21st army corps
attn. G-2 or SO

The following text in part has been encoded by the AF-Code Nr S-35, captured in January 45 by German troops. I found this item casually under my papers in the last days and send it back with the letter (by the way we got never american messages in that code!). I assure that nobody knows anything about the code except myself and two comrades (Werner Klett and Rainer Lauerbach) who both live in the same camp. I assure further that I never had contact with the NSDAP or its organizations. My mother has been born in Chile and I lived four years in Santiago. My comrades also never had any contact with the NSDAP; Klett is married with a Norwegian and lived eleven years in Belgium, France and Spain. We have been discharged officially of the Wehrmacht in March 45. Our knowledge in English actually are not the best one's. We forgot many words and grammar, but can polish up it in a few days by speaking often with Americans.

Follows the Code-text

* See also Appendix 3



Information unit radio intelligence company 626. Until autumn we worked against RUSSIA, then we made radio reconnaissance against American 7 Army quite successful.

I speak Russian well and am expert in decypherment, translations, and all signal operation. I beg urgently interview.

Ch. H. Haupts

HAUPTS

Karl-Heinz HAUPTS described his job as Endauswerter in the Signals Intelligence service. He said that he had had four years experience on Russian traffic and had studied two figure, three figure, four figure and five figure traffic. He stated that two figure was simple, three figure presented few difficulties, four figure was very difficult, and five figure could be broken with cribs. He added that depth was never obtained on five figure, stating that it was this fact which caused the trouble. When asked if he had ever tackled five letter traffic, he stated that this was a relatively new Russian code and that it was a machine cipher, and, as far as he was concerned, unbreakable.

The prisoner gave a synopsis of the organization of his department. At the head of the Leitstelle der NA was Oberst Boetzel. Under him were eight Kommandeure der NA. Nos 1,2,3 and 8 dealt with the East, No. 4 with the Balkans and was then given to OBW, 5 was Sudwest, 6 was the 21st Army Group and 7 was Italy. Each Kommandeur had two to three or more companies. There were 12 Fernaufklaerungskompanien, of which 626 was one. There were 17 Nahaufklaerungskompanien, but many of these ceased functioning sometime before the capitulation. In addition there were 13 Feste Horchstellungen. These had special tasks such as diplomatic traffic, etc. and had existed in peacetime. The prisoner stated that until quite recently he worked independently of any officers, but just before the capitulation a Leutnant Wolfram was attached to his section. He stated that the officer was new, young and inexperienced.

He said that originally there were about 300 men in his company. Of these some 20 were in the Bad Aibling camp at that moment. He did not know where the others were, but suggested that some had already gone home. He listed the names of those he could remember in the Camp, fifteen in all.

He claims knowledge of Russian, as stated in his letter. As he had four years of experience of Russian traffic interception, he may be presumed to have a fair knowledge of Russian order of battle.

KLETT

Prisoner Klett belonged for two and a half years to the Leitstelle Nachrichtenaufklaerung/West, in Berlin. He gave the address as Bendlerstrasse 28, Berlin. The prisoner was always employed against the West, especially against the U.S.A.

His work was T/A on a grand scale. It consisted of summarizing the reports from the Kommandeure der NA and passing on a synopsis to the General Staff. The material for the Kommandeur's reports was derived from T/A and D/F and low and medium grade decodes. The head of his department from 12 May, 1942 until approximately July 1944 was a Captain OPITZ (who, the prisoner said, was now believed to be in Japan). The departments of his organization were originally 1) England, 2) U.S.A., 3) Italy, Balkans, Greece and Turkey, 4) Tunisia and the near East, 5) Portugal and Spain.

In September 1944 the station moved to Zossen and was fused with Leitstelle Ost. (Leitstelle Ost did not include Japanese traffic which was not listened to). From July until November 1944 the head of Leitstelle West was Hauptmann Bode. The head of Leitstelle Ost was Lt. Col. Andrae, who was also in charge of the whole combined Leitstelle. The successor to

Appendix 15 (Contd.)

Hauptmann Bode in Leitstelle West was a retired officer, Hauptmann Thiel, a professor at the University of Koenigsberg, a geographer and specialist in Oriental languages. The Leitstelle, while at Zossen, was located at Maybach I, the inner enclosure. The prisoner mentioned Amtmann Bodemüller and his assistant Hauptmann Farquardt as in charge of the Organisations-abteilung West. They were responsible for the distribution of specialist personnel. The corresponding figure for the Ost was Amtmann Block.

The prisoner stated that 35 copies of his combined summary were made. When pressed as to what happened to texts which were insoluble at his level, he replied that such texts would go to Jüterbog. He strenuously denied that OKW ever had anything to do with such texts, insisting finally that only OKH dealt with them. He admitted the existence of a group of specialists ("professors and mathematicians" as he put it) at OKW/OHL. He stated that the organization at Jüterbog was a group of specialists in cryptanalysis, but disclaimed any knowledge of the personnel or their activities.

Despite the prisoner's apparent lack of high-grade decodes, a very extensive tab could be kept on American units and officers (they did not bother below the rank of captain), all of which was card-indexed. He stated that an enormous amount of information on troop movements was obtained from a relatively simple source, e.g., quotation of A.P.O.s in clear, etc. A careful comparison of such sources in U.S.A. traffic and in traffic in England enabled them to get an exact picture of the transportation of American troops to Great Britain and their Order of Battle. From May or June, 1944, a section with the title Punkbetriebszeichenforschung was set up which dealt with call-sign systems. By January, 1945, with the aid of a few captured pages, work was nearing perfection and Hollerith machines were being employed on this project.

In November, 1944, the Leitstelle West was divided into three Referate, I.- U.S.A., II.- Great Britain, III.- Invasion front.

The prisoner left the Leitstelle in December, 1944. At this time, it had been ordered by General Praun that all men in uniform who were capable of front line service should join the forces in the field. However, since one of the members of this organization had previously been captured by the Russians who had extracted valuable information from him, in practice these men were not sent to the front lines but to units such as the 626NA company which were behind the lines. The prisoner believed that when the Leitstelle left Zossen it had moved to Reichenhall.

The prisoner prepared simple charts showing the organization of the Leitstelle NA and of the whole NA. He insisted on destroying these charts. It is believed that much more information on the detailed working of the organization would willingly be supplied by the prisoner.

LAUERBACH

Prisoner Lauerbach was an intercept operator first taking Russian traffic and then working in the West. Here, he intercepted 7th, 1st, 9th, and 3rd Armies. He had also made studies of traffic evaluation, independently, and contributed some information on these activities.

Appendix 15 (Contd.)

In sharp contrast to Klett, Lauerbach stated that undecypherable texts were, in fact, passed to OKW/CHI, but that no information about their contents ever came back to him or to any of his co-workers. He is, therefore, not in a position to state how they broke, if at all. He stated that it took approximately half an hour to find a British or American group on the change of both frequency and call signs. He explained that this was due to very strongly individualized procedure on the part of Allied operators and disclaimed all knowledge of any mechanical scientific aids except D/F. Prisoner knew his enemy groups not by any artificial numbering, but by their actual names, e.g., 1st Army, 7th Army, etc.

The prisoner stated that the company originally contained some 25 to 30 Auswertor. Some four or five of these were then in the Bad Aibling camp. There were no cryptographers from the company still in the camp.

APPENDIX 16

The prisoners named below were given preliminary interrogations by members of Team 1. They were later interrogated in more detail by Dr. Pickering, who has issued separate reports.

Oberstlttn KIENITZ (OKL/IC)
Oberstlttn FRIEDRICH (Gen. Nafue., Abt. III)
Oberst BOETZEL (Gen. der N.A.)
Lt. DEITMANN
Oberinspektor EUBHN
Oberst KOPP (Hoh. Kdr. d. N.A. bei OB West)
Major Dr. HENTZE

APPENDIX 17

(I). Equipment brought to Paris or U.K. by Team 1

- (1) Complete non-morse transmitting and receiving station belonging to C-in-C West. 6 Diesel trucks and 12 P's o W to set up and operate.
- (2) Complete non-morse intercepting station. 8 tons of gear, 6 P's o W to set up, repair and operate
- (3) Eleven Secret Teleprinters, Types T36, T52 B, D, D-E.
- (4) Sundry E machines and E UHREN.
- (5) 4 magnetic tape recorders, 2 portable, 2 cabinet
- (6) 40 Siemens high-speed relays.
- (7) 3 Magnetic wire recorders
- (8) Teletype tape perforator
- (9) Direction finder

(II) Documents brought back to U.K.

- 1) Documents listed in TICOM Accession list of 1 June 1945.
- 2) Documents listed in TICOM/A-2 of 13 June 1945.
- 3) Documents listed in TICOM/A-2b of 6 June 1945
- 4) Documents listed in TICOM/A -2c of 7 June 1945
- 5) Documents of Gen Nafue/III Abt. (list in preparation 16 June 1945)
- 6) Documents on general naval intelligence, (list in preparation by NSVI, 16 June 1945)
- 7) Maps of Russian front, Documents and maps on Russian order of battle, from OKL, Intelligence Division (handed over to Air Ministry).